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ABSTRACT	  
Emplacement	   and	   displacement	   can	   be	   presented	   as	   experiences	   that	   lie	   in	   direct	  
opposition	   to	   each	   other.	   To	   experience	   emplacement	   is	   to	   be	   immersed	  within	   the	   rich	  
nuances	  of	  a	  place;	  it	  is	  to	  embody	  some	  kind	  of	  authentic	  existence	  that	  sees	  the	  self	  and	  
the	  place	  inhabited	  as	  deeply	  aligned.	  The	  experience	  of	  displacement	  is	  to	  feel	  oneself	  as	  
so	  disconnected	  from	  the	  intricacies	  of	  a	  place	  as	  to	  assume	  that	  such	  intricacies	  are	  non-­‐
existent;	   the	   self	   is	   unable	   to	   find	   a	   home	  within	   a	   place	   as	   the	   place	   is	   experienced	   as	  
devoid	   of	   meaning	   and	   significance.	   In	   this	   paper	   I	   challenge	   this	   dualistic	   account	   of	  
emplacement	  and	  displacement	  using	  Val	  Plumwood’s	  observations	  pertaining	  to	  dualisms	  
and	  dismantling	  dualisms.	  I	  explore	  Plumwood’s	  account	  of	  ‘Being	  Prey’	  as	  an	  example	  of	  
how	  a	  non-­‐dualistic	  understanding	  of	  ‘placement’	  may	  emerge.	  INTRODUCTION	  The	   characteristics	   and	   consequences	   of	   being	   emplaced	   and	   of	   being	   displaced	   are	  recurrent	  themes	  in	  place	  discourse	  and	  in	  some	  branches	  of	  environmental	  ethics.	  How	  one	   experiences	   or	   identifies	   oneself	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   place	   or	   a	   suite	   of	   places,	   and	  perhaps	   how	  one	   should	   identify	   oneself,	   provides	   an	   ontological	   backbone	   for	  much	  place	   literature.	   This	   includes	   manifestations	   of	   displacement	   and	   emplacement	   as	  distinct	  experiences	  that	  lie	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  each	  other;	  they	  form	  a	  “simple	  but	  basic	   dualism”	   (Relph,	   1976:	   49).	   As	   Geographer	   Edward	   Relph	   describes,	   existential	  outsideness	  –	  the	  most	  extreme	  experience	  of	  displacement	  –	  involves:	  A	   self	   conscious	   and	   reflective	   uninvolvement,	   an	   alienation	   from	   people	   and	  places,	  homelessness,	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  unreality	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  of	  not	  belonging.	  From	  such	  a	  perspective	  places	  cannot	  be	  significant	  centres	  of	  existence,	  but	  are	  at	  best	  backgrounds	  to	  activities	   that	  are	  without	  sense,	  mere	  chimeras,	  and	  at	  worst	  are	  voids	  (Rekph,	  1976:	  51).	  	  Such	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  receive	  most	  graphic	  representation	  in	  the	  Fall	  from	  Grace;	   a	   fall	   out	   of	   place	   and	   an	   associated	   a	   loss	   self	   and	   agency.	   For	   example,	   deep	  ecology	  proponent	  George	  Sessions	  writes:	  Most	  people	  are	   like	   the	  slaves	   in	  Plato’s	  cave;	   they	  have	  mostly	  opinion	  about	  casual	  sequences	  in	  Nature	  in	  that	  their	  perceptions	  and	  thoughts	  are	  colored	  by	  their	  ego	  desires.	  They	  are	  essentially	  helpless	  and	  passive,	  moved	  by	  emotions,	  fears,	  and	  desires	  based	  on	  ignorance	  and	  imagination,	  and	  living	  life	  largely	  by	  reacting	  to	  external	  causes	  and	  situations	  (Sessions,	  1985:	  239).	  	  At	  the	  other	  pole	  Relph	  positions	  existential	  insideness	  –	  the	  most	  profound	  experience	  of	  emplacement,	   in	  which	  a	  place	  is	  experienced	  without	  deliberate	  and	  self-­‐conscious	  reflection	   yet	   is	   full	   of	   significances.	   It	   is	   the	   insideness	   that	  most	   people	   experience	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when	  they	  are	  at	  home	  and	  in	  their	  own	  town	  or	  region,	  when	  they	  know	  the	  place	  and	  its	  people	  and	  are	  known	  and	  accepted	  there	  (Relph,	  1976:	  55).	  	  To	  experience	  emplacement	  is	  to	  be	  immersed	  within	  the	  rich	  nuances	  of	  a	  place;	  it	   is	   to	   embody	   some	   kind	   of	   authentic	   existence	   that	   sees	   the	   self	   and	   the	   place	  inhabited	  as	  deeply	  aligned.	  At	  the	  very	  least	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  if	  emplaced,	  life,	  both	  for	  the	  individual	  and	  for	  the	  human	  and	  more-­‐than-­‐human	  communities,	  will	  be	  better.	  As	  place	  writer	  John	  Cameron	  observes:	  	  Sustainability	   includes	   sustaining	   a	   sense	   of	   place,	   being	   moved	   and	   moving	  others	   through	  a	   love	  of	   the	  particular	  –	   the	  way	  a	   late-­‐afternoon	  shaft	  of	   light	  illuminates	   a	   bough	   of	   white	   azaleas,	   the	   way	   the	   wind	   carves	   ovoid	   hollows	  beneath	   the	   iron-­‐enriched	   skin	   of	   the	  Hawkesbury	   sandstone	   (Cameron,	   2003:	  37).	  	  In	   this	   paper	   I	   challenge	   such	   polarised,	   dualistic	   experiential	   descriptions	   of	  emplacement	   and	   displacement,	   arguing	   that	   they	   provide	   neither	   an	   accurate	   nor	  adequate	   ontological	   basis	   for	   approaching	   the	   complexities	   and	  multiplicities	   of	   self	  and	  of	  the	  self	  in	  relation	  to	  place.	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  work	  of	  pre-­‐eminent	  philosopher	  and	  ecofeminist	   Val	   Plumwood,	   particularly	   her	   observations	   pertaining	   to	   dualisms	   and	  dismantling	   dualisms	   (1991;	   1993).	   I	   begin	   by	   outlining	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	  emplacement/displacement	  dualism	  including	  the	  characteristics	  ascribed	  to	  each	  pole,	  and	   discuss	   what	   dismantling	   this	   dualism	  may	   and	  may	   not	   involve.	   I	   then	   explore	  Plumwood’s	  (1996)i	  account	  of	  her	  crocodile	  attack	  in	  Kakadu,	  northern	  Australia	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  a	  non-­‐dualistic	  understanding	  of	  ‘placement’	  may	  emerge.	  I	  conclude	  by	  proposing	   Relph’s	   interconnected	   notions	   of	   insideness	   and	   outsideness	   as	   a	   starting	  point	   from	  which	   to	   account	   for	   the	   fluxing	   complexity	   and	  multiplicity	   of	   self	  within	  place.	   I	   highlight	   that	   while	   Relph	   identifies	   his	   understanding	   of	   insideness	   and	  outsideness	  as	  a	   ‘dualism’,	  he	  describes	  it	  as	  having	  spectral	  qualities	  –	  where	  there	  is	  movement	  between	  seven	  manifestations	  of	  outsideness	  and	   insideness	   (Relph,	  1976:	  49-­‐50).	  	  EMPLACEMENT/DISPLACEMENT	  Plumwood	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  much	  ecological	  thought	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  goal	  of	  being	  self-­‐sufficient	  within	   small,	   atomistic	   communities,	  while	  disregarding	   the	  multiplicity	  and	   complexity	   of	   the	   network	   of	   places	   that	   support	   these	   communities.	   She	   argues	  that	  “ecological	  thought	  has	  to	  be	  much	  more	  than	  a	  literary	  rhapsody	  about	  nice	  places,	  or	   about	  nice	   times	   (epiphanies)	   in	  nice	  places”	   (Plumwood,	  2008:	  139).	   It	  must	   also	  take	   into	   account	   the	   shadow	   places	   –	   those	   ‘out	   of	   sight,	   out	   of	   mind’	   places	   that	  support	   where	   and	   how	   we	   live	   and	   are	   essential,	   even,	   in	   our	   envisioning	   of	   more	  idealised	  home	  places.	  	  While	   not	   speaking	   directly	   of	   an	   emplacement/displacement	   dualism,	  Plumwood’s	   account	   of	   a	   singular	   homeplace	   spilt	   from	   our	   networked	   and	   global	  ecological	   footprint,	   lies	   in	   direct	   relation	   to	   such	   a	   dualism	   and	   emphasises	   the	  interrelationship	  between	  coexistent	  dualisms.	  She	  argues:	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The	  dissociation	  of	  the	  affective	  place	  (the	  place	  of	  and	  in	  mind,	  attachment	  and	  identification,	   political	   effectiveness,	   family	   history,	   ancestral	   place)	   from	   the	  economic	   place	   that	   is	   such	   a	   feature	   of	   the	   global	   market	   is	   yet	   another	  manifestation	   of	   the	   mind/body	   dualism	   that	   has	   shaped	   western	   tradition...	  Contemporary	   market-­‐based	   practices	   that	   effect	   a	   dissociation	   between	  affective/identity	   places	   and	   places	   of	   production	   reduce	   and	   fragment	   place,	  stripping	  it	  of	  meaning	  (Plumwood,	  2008:	  141).	  	  Without	   an	   adequate	   critique	   of	   dualistic	   frameworks,	   aspects	   of	   place	   discourse	   and	  environmental	   ethics	  unwittingly	   take	  on	  board	  and	   reinforce	   these	   structures.	  Home	  places	   and	   shadow	   places	   represent	   not	   poles	   of	   a	   geographical	   dualism	   –	   a	   split	  between	  what	  is	  here	  and	  what	  is	  thereii	  –	  they	  also	  have	  ontological	  dimensions.	  What	  it	   means	   and	   how	   it	   is	   to	   exist	   in	   homeplaces	   and	   shadow	   places	   also	   falls	   within	   a	  dualistic	  structure,	  a	  structure	  that	  is	  definable	  though	  the	  notions	  of	  emplacement	  and	  displacement	   and	   the	   interrelationships	   these	   hold	   with	   other	   dualisms	   such	   as	  wild/built,	  mind/body	  and	  self/other.	  	  Plumwood	  (1991;	  1993)	  identifies	  five	  features	  that	  define	  a	  dualism:	  1.	  Backgrounding	  (denial)	  Backgrounding	   is	   the	   “refusal	   of	   dualism	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	   devalued	   term	   of	   a	  disjunctive	  pair	  contributes	  in	  any	  important	  way	  to	  the	  privileged	  term”	  (Diehm	  2003:	  33).	  It	  is	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  mutually	  constitutive	  relationship	  between	  the	  pair.	  In	  terms	  of	  emplacement/displacement	  there	  is	  no	  recognition	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  emplacement	  relies	   significantly	   upon	   and	   is	   interrelated	  with	   the	   experience	   of	   displacement;	   the	  contribution	  that	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  make	  to	  experiences	  of	  emplacement	   is	  denied.	  Descriptive	  accounts	  of	  sense	  of	  place	  frequently	  exclude	  mention	  of	  unsettling	  experiences	  such	  as	  pest	  infestations,	  violence,	  illness,	  grief	  and	  the	  perceived	  mundane	  nature	  of	  housework.	  They	  tend	  to	  focus	  entirely	  on	  experiences	  of	  emplacement	  such	  as	   feelings	   of	   attunement	   and	   attachment,	   socialisation	   with	   like-­‐minded	   people,	  passive	  encounters	  with	  friendly	  (native)	  species	  and	  emersion	  within	  rewarding	  artist	  endeavours.	   The	   contribution	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   displacement	   is	   backgrounded	   or	  denied	  through	  non-­‐reference,	  despite	  such	  experiences	  being	  common	  features	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life.	  For	   example,	   in	   descriptions	   of	   his	   sense	   of	   place	   John	   Cameron	   describes	   his	  personal	   journey	   in	   dwelling	   as	   “bringing	   into	   conscious	   awareness	   how	   I	   dwell,	   and	  how	  place	  sustains	  and	  shapes	  my	  existence”	  (2003:	  36).	  However,	  Cameron’s	  accounts	  of	  emplacement,	  both	  in	  the	  Blue	  Mountains	  west	  of	  Sydney	  (2003)	  and	  on	  Bruny	  Island	  in	   southern	   Tasmania	   (2008a;	   2008b;	   2009)	  make	   no	   reference	   to	   the	   intensive	   and	  repetitive	   work	   of	   maintaining	   a	   home	   through	   housework,	   even	   though	   such	   work	  must	   be	   an	   inherent	   part	   of	   how	   place	   sustains	   and	   shapes	   Cameron’s	   existence	  wherever	   he	   is	   dwelling.	   Such	   work,	   and	   the	   experiences	   of	   displacement	   so	   often	  associated	   with	   it,	   are	   backgrounded	   and	   in	   effect	   denied	   in	   his	   descriptions	   of	  emplacement.	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2.	  Radical	  exclusion	  (hyperseparation)	  Radical	   exclusion	   is	   dualism’s	   attempt	   to	   magnify	   the	   differences	   between	   disjuncts,	  which	  promotes	  a	  view	  of	  them	  as	  different	  not	  merely	   in	  degree	  but	   in	  kind”	  (Diehm	  2003:	   33).	   The	  hyperseparation	  of	   emplacement	   and	  displacement	   enforces	   the	   ideas	  that	  there	  are	  two	  unique	  types	  of	  experience	  of	  place	  and	  self	  within	  place.	  	  On	   one	   hand	   the	   experience	   of	   emplacement	   is	   characterised	   by	   a	   sense	   of	  wholeness,	  contentment,	  commitment,	  deep	  knowledge,	  mindfulness,	  capacity	  for	  deep	  rational	  thought,	  and	  the	  capacity	  for	  care	  and	  consideration	  of	  others.	  This	  experience	  is	   understood	   to	   be	   rich	   and	   nuanced,	   as	   illustrated	   in	   Paul	   Shepard’s	   account	   of	  Aboriginal	  Australia:iii	  In	   going	   on	   the	   pilgrimage	   called	   walkabout,	   the	   Aborigine	   travels	   to	   a	  succession	  of	  named	  places,	  each	  familiar	  from	  childhood	  and	  each	  the	  place	  of	  some	  episode	  in	  the	  story	  of	  creation.	  The	  sacred	  qualities	  of	  each	  are	  heightened	  by	   symbolic	   art	   forms	   and	   religious	   relics.	   The	   journey	   is	   into	   the	   interior	   in	  every	   sense,	   as	  myth	   is	   the	   dramatic	   externalization	   of	   the	   events	   of	   an	   inner	  history.	  To	  the	  pilgrims	  these	  places	  are	  profoundly	  moving.	  The	  landscape	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  archive	  where	  the	  individual	  moves	  simultaneously	  through	  his	  personal	  and	   tribal	   past,	   renewing	   contact	   with	   crucial	   points,	   a	   journey	   into	   time	   and	  space	  refreshing	  the	  meaning	  of	  his	  own	  being	  (Shepard,	  1977:	  31).	  	  The	  experience	  of	  displacement,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  held	  to	  have	  nothing	  in	  common	  with	  emplacement,	  and	  is	  characterised	  by	  shallow	  knowledge,	  insatiability,	  fickleness,	  fear,	  anxiety	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  awareness	  of	  any	  these	  characteristics	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  ‘a	  problem.’	  In	  experiencing	  oneself	  as	  emplaced	  one	  is	  a	  master	  of	  oneself,	  whereas	  in	   the	   experience	   of	   displacement	   one	   is	   a	   slave	   to	   others.	   As	   previously	   cited	   deep	  ecologist	   George	   Sessions	   describes,	   with	   reference	   to	   Plato’s	   cave,	   ‘most	   people’	   as	  helpless,	  passive,	  ignorant	  and	  reactionary	  (Sessions,	  1985:	  239):iv	  A	   significant	   consequence	   of	   this	   hyperseparation	   is	   that	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   the	  displacement	   of	   others	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   machinations	   of	   beings	   experiencing	  displacement.	   As	   no	   overlap	   between	   the	   two	   poles	   is	   perceived,	   the	   experience	   of	  emplacement	  can	  in	  no	  way	  be	  involved	  with	  or	  implicated	  in	  generating	  experiences	  of	  displacement.	  	  3.	  Incorporation	  (relational	  definition)	  Incorporation	   is	   “the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	   characteristics	   associated	  with	  one	   side	  of	  the	  dualism	  are	  taken	  as	  primary,	  and	  the	  other	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  lack	  of	  these	  qualities”	  (Diehm	  2003:	  33).	  As	  exemplified	  above	  (Sessions,	  1985;	  Shepard,	  1977),	  it	  is	  what	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  lacks	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  emplacement	  that	  is	  used	  to	  define	  its	  characteristics.	  	  It	   is	   assumed,	   within	   a	   dualistic	   framework,	   that	   transformation	   from	   the	  experience	   of	   displacement	   into	   that	   of	   emplacement	   is	   possible,	   but	   only	   through	  incorporation.	   To	   experience	   emplacement	   is	   to	   attain	   the	   characteristics	   of	  emplacement	   and	   disregard	   and	   discard	   those	   associated	   with	   the	   experience	   of	  displacement.	  There	  is	  nothing	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  has	  to	  offer	  which	  is	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primary.	   As	   Bill	   Devall	   states:	   “Outside	   the	   ordered,	   bordered,	   fenced,	   domesticated,	  patrolled,	  controlled	  areas	  of	  our	  region,	  our	  wild	  self	  is	  waiting”	  (Devall,	  1988:	  70-­‐1).	  4.	  Instrumentalisation	  (objectification)	  Instrumentalisation	  “sees	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  inferiorized	  pole	  of	  the	  dualism	  as	  having	  meaning,	   purpose	   or	   function	   solely	   in	   relation	   to	   those	  which	   are	   privileged,	  treating	  the	  ends,	  goals,	  or	  activities	  of	  the	  former	  as	  instruments	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  latter”	  (Diehm	  2003:	  33).	  The	  experience	  of	  displacement	  does	  not	  have	  ends	  of	  its	  own	  –	   it	   is	   part	   of	   the	   indefinite	   Fall	   from	   Grace,	   serving	   only	   as	   a	   foil	   for	   the	   need	   of	  emplacement.	  5.	  Homogenisation	  or	  stereotyping	  Homogenisation	   involves	   “minimising	   differences	   among	   those	   associated	   with	   the	  devalued	  class	  of	  terms”	  (Diehm	  2003:	  33).	  The	  experience	  of	  displacement	  is	  a	  singular	  experience	   –	   there	   is	   no	   nuanced	   complexity	   within	   this	   experience	   and	   no	  differentiation	  can	  be	  made	  between	  multiple	  experiences	  of	  displacement.	  Examples	  of	  this	   include	   Sessions	   (1985),	   cited	   above,	   and	   fellow	   deep	   ecologist,	   Andrew	  McLaughlin:	  Most	   industrial	   people	   live	   lives	   that	   are	   fairly	   similar	   in	   structure,	   despite	  surface	  differences…	  At	  a	  sensory	  level,	  urban	  life	  is	  relentlessly	  distracting.	  The	  hum	   of	   machines	   and	   vehicles	   and	   the	   sounds	   of	   radios	   and	   televisions	  surrounds	  city	  life.	  Silence	  is	  lost.	  People	  live	  by	  clocks	  and	  by	  schedules	  set	  by	  work	   and	   amusement.	   Daily	   life	   is	   a	   celebration	   of	   material	   consumption,	   as	  people	   are	   surrounded	   by	   things	   to	   be	   purchased	   and	   exotic	   foods	   to	   be	  consumed	  (McLaughlin,	  1993:	  70-­‐71).	  	  TOWARDS	  DISMANTLEMENT	  The	   emplacement/displacement	   dualism	   provides	   neither	   an	   accurate	   nor	   adequate	  account	  of	  how	  we	  encounter	  places	  and	  how	  we	  dwell	  within	  place.	  Interconnectivities	  are	  backgrounded	  and	  denied,	  nuances	  and	  complexities	  dissolved,	  and	   the	  value	  and	  worth	  of	  some	  experiences	  (and	  those	  doing	  the	  experiencing)	  sidestepped.	  This	  offers	  a	  simplistic	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  privileged	  account	  of	  ‘placement’	  that	  masks,	  suppresses	  and	   potentially	   demonises	   other	   possible	   accounts.	   It	   is	   an	   account	   that	   requires	  dismantling	   not	   only	   as	   a	   means	   of	   unearthing	   other	   richer	   conceptions	   of	   self	   in	  relation	  to	  place,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  addressing,	  in	  part,	  allegations	  of	  parochial	  and	  fascist	  tendencies	  aimed	  at	  aspects	  of	  place	  discourse.	  	  Geographer	   Doreen	   Massey	   argues	   that	   there	   exists	   within	   aspects	   of	   place	  discourse	  a	  focus	  on	  local	  belonging;	  a	  “notion	  of	  dichotomy	  between	  authentically	  local	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  foreign/intruder	  on	  the	  other”	  (Massey,	  2006:	  35).v	  Manifestations	  of	  this	  may	  be	  as	  malignant	  as	  Germanenturm	  –	  the	  notion	  used	  by	  the	  Nazis	  as	  the	  basis	  for	   what	   they	   saw	   as	   their	   race	   (and	   place)	   determined	   supremacy	   (Schama,	   1996).	  Undercutting	   such	   reactionary	   senses	   of	   place	   and	   identity	   requires,	   in	   part,	   a	  dismantling	  of	  the	  dualistic	  structures	  that	  inform	  them.	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Dismantling	  a	  dualism,	  or	  attempting	  to	  envisage	  how	  we	  describe	  being	  in	  place	  beyond	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  emplacement/displacement	  dualism	   is	   a	   complex	  affair.	  As	   Plumwood	   (1993)	   argues,	   it	   not	   only	   requires	   awareness	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  specific	   dualism,	   but	   requires	   attentive	   and	   critical	   reflection	   upon	   the	   structure	   of	  dualism	  that	  underpins	  western	  culture.	  Dualisms	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  isolation	  to	  each	  other,	  but	   act	   to	   reinforce	   and	   validate	   each	   other	   in	   a	   complex	   web	   of	   perpetuation.	   To	  attempt	   to	   change	   dualistic	   assumptions	   requires	   not	   only	   awareness	   of	   a	   particular	  dualism	   it	   also	   requires	   a	   radical	   restructuring	   of	   the	   foundations	   of	   reason	   and	  rationality	  (Plumwood,	  2002).	  	  In	  relation	  to	  specific	  dualisms,	  Plumwood	  argues	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  dismantle	  a	   dualism	   and	   bring	   value	   to	   the	   inferiorised	   side	   to	   the	   pole	  must	   be	   a	   critical	   and	  qualifying	  one	  (Plumwood,	  1993:	  63).	  She	  states	  that	  restructuring	  individual	  dualisms	  is	   not	   simply	   a	   matter	   of	   recognising	   and	   valuing	   difference,	   but	   of	   recognising	   and	  valuing	  the	  complex	   interactions	  of	  both	  continuity	  and	  difference:	  “What	  will	  now	  be	  valued	   positively	   will	   not	   be	   the	   original,	   polarised	   characteristics,	   but	   liberatory	  analogues	   obtained	   by	   transcending	   the	   false	   choices	   created	   by	   the	   polarised	  understandings	  of	  dualism”	  (Plumwood,	  1993:	  66).	  	  As	   such,	   a	   move	   towards	   dismantling	   the	   emplacement/displacement	   dualism	  involves	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  five	  features	  of	  dualism	  outlined	  above	  with	  reference	  to	   Plumwood’s	   (1993)	   own	   observations	   on	  moving	   beyond	   the	   dualistic	   framework.	  Dismantling	  the	  emplacement/displacement	  dualism	  includes:	  
• Recognising	   the	   contribution	   of	   that	   which	   has	   been	   backgrounded,	   and	  acknowledging	   the	   dependency	   of	   the	   privileged	   pole	   on	   the	   inferiorised	   pole	  (Plumwood,	   1993:	   60).	   This	   includes	   acknowledging	   the	   interdependencies	   that	  exist	  between	  emplacement	  and	  displacement	  and	  recognising	   that	   the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  is	  a	  contributor	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  emplacement.	  	  
• Affirming	   continuity,	   including	   re-­‐conceiving	   the	   poles	   in	   a	   more	   integrated	   way,	  reclaiming	   the	   denied	   overlap	   and	   breaking	   the	   false	   choice	   between	   the	   two	  (Plumwood,	   1993:	   60).	   There	   is	   nothing	   absolutely	   unique	   that	   separates	   the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  from	  that	  of	  emplacement.	  There	  may	  be	  aspects	  of	  each	  that	  differ	  from	  the	  other	  but	  there	  are	  also	  aspects	  that	  both	  types	  of	  experiences	  may	  share;	  there	  is	  some	  common	  ground	  between	  the	  two	  that	  is	  the	  continuity	  of	  experience.	   It	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   matter	   of	   either	   experiencing	   emplacement	   or	  experiencing	  displacement.	  	  
• Reviewing	  the	  identities	  of	  both	  poles	  through	  the	  rediscovery	  of	  a	   language	  and	  a	  narrative	  for	  the	  inferiorized	  side	  (Plumwood,	  1993:	  60).	  In	  other	  words,	  letting	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  speak	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	  and	  allowing	  understandings	  of	  what	   it	   means	   to	   experience	   both	   emplacement	   and	   displacement	   be	   changed	   by	  this.	  	  
• Recognising	  the	  inferiorized	  disjunct	  as	  a	  centre	  of	  value	  on	  its	  own	  account,	  and	  one	  worthy	  of	  respect	  (Plumwood,	  1993:	  60).	  It	  involves	  recognising	  that	  the	  experience	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of	   displacement	   carries	   its	   own	   centres	   of	   meaning	   and	   value;	   its	   own	   centres	  worthy	  of	  consideration	  and	  respect.	  	  
• Recognising	   the	   complexity	   and	   diversity	   of	   the	   ‘other	   nations,’	   which	   have	   been	  homogenised	   and	   marginalised	   in	   homologising	   accounts	   of	   the	   inferiorized	   pole	  (Plumwood,	  1993:60).	  This	  includes	  recognising	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  is	   nuanced,	   complex	   and	   diverse,	   and	   is	   as	   a	   situational	   affair	   as	   experiences	   of	  emplacement.	  	  Any	  move	  to	  restructure	  the	  emplacement/displacement	  dualism	  cannot	  be	  conceived	  as	  a	  straightforward	  dissemination	  of	  rights	  or	  worth	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  displacement;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  acknowledgement	  and	  valuing	  of	  difference	  that	  sees	  the	  characteristics	  of	  displacement	  moved	  from	  the	  inferiorized	  to	  the	  prioritised	  pole.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  saying,	  for	  example,	  that	  we	  used	  to	  value	  place-­‐based	  artisanship	  and	  now	  we	  will	  recognise	  the	  value	  of	  mass	  production.	  To	  not	  critique	  or	  qualify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  each	  ensures	  the	  retention	  of	  dualistic	  features,	  not	  a	  move	  beyond	  them.	  	  Nor	   is	   it	   a	  matter	   of	  moving	   towards	   a	   conception	   for	  which	   there	   is	   nothing	  profoundly	  different	  about	  the	  two	  experiences;	  melding	  the	  two	  without	  critiquing	  and	  quantifying	  the	  characteristics	  ascribed	  to	  the	  two	  and	  perhaps	  attempting	  to	  do	  away	  with	   the	   two	  notions	  of	   ‘placement’	   (or	  even	   ‘place’)	  as	   identifiers	  with	  contested	  and	  disrupted	   meanings.	   In	   rendering	   experiences	   of	   emplacement	   and	   displacement	  meaningless,	   there	   is	   no	   basis	   for	   dialogue	   within	   the	   dualism;	   no	   possibility	   for	  dialogue	   surrounding	   ‘placement’	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   self	   in	   relation	   to	   place.	   By	  attempting	  to	  discard	  something	  that	   is	  so	  deeply	  embedded	  within	  western	  culture	  –	  attempting	   to	   ‘put	   it	   out	   of	   critiques’	   way	   –	   the	   possibility	   for	   change	   is	   effectively	  subdued.	   Experiences	   and	   identities	   emerging	   in	   the	   perceived	   void	   will	   remain	  dependent	  upon	  the	  dualistic	  configuration	  of	  the	  originating	  poles.	  	  Neither	   is	   it	   a	  move	   to	   affirm	   the	   experience	   of	   displacement	   as	   in	   some	  way	  warranting	  more	  attention,	  as	  more	  meaningful	  and	  of	  greater	  value	  that	  the	  experience	  of	   emplacement.	   For	   example,	   a	   move	   that	   involves	   the	   reversal	   of	   the	   poles	   and	   in	  which	   experiences	   of	   displacement	   are	   actively	   promoted	   and	   pursued	   is	   obviously	  problematic	   and	   fails	   to	   recognise	   that	   many	   of	   the	   characteristics	   ascribed	   to	   the	  experience	  of	  displacement	  are	  caught	  up	  within	  the	  powerlessness	  of	  the	  subordinate.	  Switching	  the	  poles	  will	  not	  necessarily	  resolve	  the	  existing	  power	  imbalance.	  	  All	   of	   these	   approaches	   explicitly	   or	   implicitly	   act	   to	  maintain	   the	   structure	   of	  dualism	  (Plumwood,	  1993)	  and	  offer	  no	  pathway	  towards	  some	  other	  understanding	  of	  ‘placement’	  and	  the	  ontological	  nature	  of	  place.	  As	  with	  the	  male/female	  dualism,	   it	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  argue	  that	  men	  and	  women	  are	  simply	  different	  without	  also	  looking	  at	  how	  and	  why	  they	  are	  conceived	  as	  different.	   It	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  say	  men	  and	  women	  are	  in	  fact	  the	  same	  –	  perhaps	  attempting	  to	  render	  meaningless	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘gender’–	  without	   considering	   the	   dynamics	   that	   underpin	   this	   apparent	   equity.	   It	   is	   also	   not	  adequate	  to	  ascribe	  power	  and	  privilege	  to	  women	  and	  relegate	  men	  to	  the	  subaltern.	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As	  Plumwood	  observes,	  in	  moving	  to	  dismantle	  a	  dualism	  we	  aim	  to	  avoid	  the	  Swamp	  of	  Affirmation,	  the	  Desert	  of	  Difference,	  and	  the	  Cavern	  of	  Reversal	  (1993:	  61).	  	  We	   aim,	   instead,	   to	   use	   our	   familiarity	   within	   the	   emplacement/displacement	  dualism	  to	   find	  our	   footing	  on	  a	  Pathway	  of	  Relationality;	   in	  moving	  to	  dismantle	   this	  dualism	   we	   are	   stepping	   out	   within	   the	   interrelatedness	   of	   the	   two.	   This	   involves	   a	  reconfiguration	   of	   emplacement	   as	   a	   fluxing	   ontology	   that	   includes	   characteristics	   of	  displacement,	  and	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  displacement	  as	  a	  fluxing	  ontology	  that	  includes	  characteristics	   of	   emplacement.	   It	   is	   also	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   characteristics	   of	   each,	   as	   in	  dialogue	   with	   each	   other	   displacement	   and	   emplacement	   create	   something	   unique,	  more	  integrated	  and	  situationally	  nuanced.	  	  Although	   far	   from	   unproblematic,	   experiences	   of	   displacement	   can	   be	  acknowledged	   as	   capable	   contributors	   within	   libratory	   and	   subversive	   practise;	   they	  can	  be	  recognised	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  meaningful	  and	  embodied	  experience.	  However,	  it	   is	   important	   not	   to	   under	   estimate	   of	   the	   horror	   experienced	   by	   many	   displaced	  people	   and	   beings.	   As	   previously	   discussed	   the	   aim	   of	   dismantling	   the	  emplacement/displacement	  dualism	  is	  not	  to	  blindly	  reverse	  the	  poles	  and	  value	  one	  in	  conjunction	   or	   above	   the	   other;	   rather	  what	   is	   of	   significance	   here	   is	   the	  multiplicity	  apparent	  within	  displacement	  experiences,	  a	  multiplicity	  within	  which	  displaced	  people	  and	   beings	   are	   recognised	   as	   active	   participants	  within	   encountering	   and	   countering	  this	  displacement.	  This	  may	  manifest,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  unique	  music	  or	  the	   evolution	  of	   a	   new	   species.	  Hence,	   powerlessness	   is	   not	   the	  only	   character	   of	   the	  displacement	  experience	  though	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  there	  may	  be	  aspects	  of	  displacement	  that	  are	  too	  enmeshed	  within	  powerlessness	  to	  be	  valued.	  Thus,	  while	  rejecting	   some	  aspects,	   it	   is	   also	  possible	   to	  move	  beyond	   the	  powerlessness	  without	  also	   rejecting	   the	  entirety	  of	   the	  experience	  of	  displacement.	  People	  and	  other	  beings	  finding	  themselves	  caught	  up	  within	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  may	  do	  well	  in	  some	  ways	   by	   unearthing	   more	   lateral	   forms	   of	   emplacement	   –forms	   of	   emplacement	   not	  recognised	   in	   the	   emplacement	   pole.	   The	   displaced	   may	   become	   emplaced	   without	  necessarily	  doing	  way	  with	  or	  abandoning	  all	  within	  their	  experience	  of	  displacement,	  but	   through	   staking	   their	   own	   claim	  at	   ‘placement’.	   Experiences	  of	   emplacement	  may	  then	  be	  informed	  and	  enriched	  in	  dialogue	  these	  other	  forms	  of	  emplacement.	  	  Our	   comprehension	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   emplacement	   shifts,	   and	   becomes	   more	  nuanced	  and	  less	  confining.	  It	  emerges	  not	  as	  a	  panacea	  but	  as	  a	  fluxing,	  highly	  nuanced,	  situationally	  varied	  and	  relationally	  dependent	  mode	  of	  dwelling;	  a	  mode	  of	  being	  that	  inhabits	  the	  shadow	  places	  as	  interconnected	  within	  the	  home	  place.	  An	  example	  of	  how	  such	   an	   understanding	   of	   emplacement	   may	   be	   narrated,	   I	   believe,	   can	   be	   found	   in	  Plumwood’s	  personal	  account	  of	  being	  prey	  in	  Kakadu	  National	  Park	  (1996).	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BEING	  PREY	  For	   many	   Australians,	   Kakadu	   feels	   like	   a	   familiar	   place.	   Even	   if	   we	   have	   never	  physically	  been	  there,	   images	  of	  water	   lilies,	  still	   reflective	  backwaters	  and	  Aboriginal	  rock	  art	  inhabit	  our	  homes	  –	  on	  posters,	  and	  in	  calendars,	  books	  and	  TV	  travel	  shows.	  A	  visit	  to	  the	  place	  will	  likely	  unsettle	  the	  sanctity	  so	  often	  portrayed	  in	  these	  images.	  Yet,	  for	   many,	   meeting	   with	   some	   of	   the	   particularities	   of	   Kakadu	   –	   being	   bitten	   by	  mosquitoes	  and	  sweltering	   in	  the	  heat	  –	  may	  be	   incidental	  and	  transitory	  experiences	  that	   are	   rapidly	   dispersed	   with	   a	   dab	   of	   lotion	   and	   the	   steady	   current	   of	   an	   air	  conditioner.	  	  On	  her	  second	  day	  of	  exploration	  in	  Kakadu,	  Plumwood’s	   feelings	  of	   familiarity	  with	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  place	  that	  emerge	  through	  photography	  and	  tourism	  began	  to	  shift	   as	   she	   took	   a	   canoe	   trip	   and	   met	   with	   other	   aspects	   of	   the	   place:	   “The	   drizzle	  turned	  to	  a	  warm	  rain	  within	  a	   few	  hours,	  and	  the	  magic	  was	   lost”	  (Plumwood,	  1996:	  32).	  In	  this	  shift,	  her	  experience	  of	  the	  place	  rapidly	  became	  more	  complex.	  Her	  sense	  of	  place	  became	   inhabited	  with	   an	   increasing	   recognition	  of	  unfamiliarity.	  The	   crocodile	  began	  to	  assert	  itself,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  “symbol	  of	  the	  power	  and	  integrity	  of	  this	  place	  and	  the	   incredible	   richness	   of	   its	   aquatic	   habitats”	   (Plumwood,	   1996:	   32),	   but	   as	   a	  manifestation	  of	  other	  possibilities.	  The	  place	  began	  to	  speak	  of	  other	  more	  crocodilian	  particularities,	  including	  ones	  significantly	  less	  dispensable	  than	  hot	  weather	  and	  a	  bite	  of	  a	  mosquito.	  	  As	   well	   as	   experiencing	   physical	   disorientation,	   Plumwood	   describes	   herself	  taking	  refuge	  from	  the	  rain,	  making	  haste	  over	  lunch,	  and	  resisting	  a	  defeated	  return	  to	  her	  trailer.	  While	  still	  holding	  onto	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  return	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  familiarity–	  through	  an	  exploration	  of	   the	  channel	   that	  she	  visited	  the	  previous	  day	  –	  Plumwood’s	  sense	   of	   place	   becomes	   dominated	   by	   an	   unfamiliarity;	   in	   sensing	   herself	   as	   being	  watched	   she	   experiences	   herself	   as	   outside	   the	   insideness	   of	   the	   place.	   The	  meaningfulness	  she	  had	  experienced	  within	  her	  sense	  of	  Kakadu	  through	  activism	  and	  wilderness	   imaginary	   now	   appears	   to	   her	   as	   somewhat	  misplaced,	   and	   she	   describes	  the	  place	  now	  as	   ‘puzzling’.	  She	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  herself	  as	   feeling	  as	  though	  she	  is	  “standing	   in	   one	   of	   the	  most	   dangerous	   places	   on	   earth”	   (Plumwood,	   1996:	   33).	   She	  feels	  herself	  as	  a	  large	  rock	  balanced	  precariously	  on	  a	  small	  rock	  –	  the	  small	  rock	  being	  the	  place	  itself,	  shrunk	  in	  meaning	  to	  an	  insubstantial	  base	  upon	  which	  to	  comprehend	  herself.	  A	  sense	  of	  relief	  at	  the	  thought	  of	  a	  return	  to	  her	  trailer,	  dominates	  her	  thoughts.	  	  As	   Plumwood	   moves	   towards	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   familiarity	   of	   her	   trailer	  home,	   the	  unexpected	  happens	  as	  a	  crocodile	   launches	  an	  attack	  on	  her	  canoe.	   In	  her	  scramble	   to	   climb	   a	   tree	   and	   to	   position	   herself	   as	   outside	   the	   crocodile’s	   realm,	   she	  attempts	   to	   ‘push’	   the	   crocodile	  back	   into	   its	  place	  within	  a	  pre-­‐colonial	  Kakadu:	   “‘Go	  away!’	   (We’re	  British	  here)”	   (Plumwood,	  1996:	  34).	  Being	  an	  outsider	  now	  offers	  not	  fear	  and	  uncertainty,	  but	  the	  familiar	  cultural	  pose	  of	  the	  colonial	  self	  setting	  itself	  apart	  from	  and	  against	  the	  colonised.	  Perhaps	  surprisingly	  both	  for	  the	  reader	  and	  Plumwood	  herself,	  within	  these	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  attack	  Plumwood	  finds	  herself	  at	  home	  within	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the	   familiar	   terrain	   of	   the	   coloniser/colonised	   dualism.	   Moments	   later	   she	   again	  glimpses	   “the	   world	   ...	   ‘from	   the	   outside’,	   as	   a	   world	   no	   longer	   my	   own,	   an	  unrecognizable	   bleak	   landscape	   composed	   of	   raw	   necessity,	   indifferent	   to	   my	   life	   or	  death”	  (Plumwood,	  1996:	  34).	  Yet,	  this	  time,	  there	  is	  nothing	  familiar	  for	  her	  here	  –	  no	  ontological	  home	  turf	  –	  just	  a	  rapid	  and	  radical	  unsettling	  of	  self,	  inhabiting	  a	  previously	  unconceivable	  place.	  	  After	  her	  bloodied	  escape	  from	  the	  crocodile,	  her	  sense	  of	  outsideness	  continues	  in	  her	  struggle	  to	  reach	  help.	  It	  includes	  “shouting	  for	  mercy	  from	  the	  sky,	  apologizing	  to	  the	   angry	   crocodile,	   repenting	   to	   this	   place	   for	   my	   intrusion”	   (Plumwood,	   1996:	   35,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  Perhaps	   due	   to	   her	   strength	   of	   spirit,	   following	   her	   escape	   from	   the	   crocodile	  Plumwood	  quickly	  regains	  some	  kind	  of	  footing.	  She	  finds	  herself	  approaching	  familiar	  ground	  again,	  not	  just	  the	  physicality	  of	  the	  ranger	  station,	  but	  her	  own	  bush	  experience	  through	   use	   of	   her	   navigation	   skills.	   Though,	   once	   rescued	   it	   is	   her	   ongoing	   sense	   of	  being	  an	  outsider	  that	  spurs	  her	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  a	  hunt	  to	  kill	  the	  crocodile:	  “I	  was	  the	   intruder,	   and	   no	   good	   purpose	   could	   be	   served	   by	   random	   revenge”	   (Plumwood,	  1996:	  36).	  	  As	   Plumwood	   heals	   and	   returns	   home	   –	   both	   physically	   and	   ontologically	   –	   a	  sense	  of	  outsideness	  and	  alienation	  continues	  to	  manifest.	  It	  fuels	  her	  ongoing	  gratitude	  for	   life:	   “The	  gift	  of	   gratitude	  came	   from	   the	   searing	   flash	  of	  near-­‐death	  knowledge,	   a	  glimpse	  ‘from	  the	  outside’	  of	  the	  alien,	   incomprehensible	  world	  in	  which	  the	  narrative	  of	  self	  has	  ended”	  (Plumwood,	  1996:	  36).	  It	  also	  dominates	  her	  response	  to	  the	  media	  coverage	  of	  her	  story,	  as	  she	  describes	  much	  coverage	  as	  giving	  “alien	  meaning”	  both	  to	  her	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  her	  experience	  (Plumwood,	  1996:	  37),	  particularly	  the	  masculinist	  portrayal	   of	   the	   attack	   as	   a	   sadistic	   rape	   and	   of	   the	   bush	   as	   no	   place	   for	   a	   woman.	  Plumwood	  was	  ‘out	  of	  place’	  within	  these	  tellings;	  the	  meanings	  of	  which	  were	  not	  lost	  on	  her,	  but	  diligently	  exclude	  other	  possible,	  more	  feminist	  portrayals.	  	  Yet,	   Plumwood	   also	   finds	   herself	   at	   home	   within	   some	   terrain	   that	   is	   very	  familiar	  for	  her	  –	  that	  of	  the	  human/nature	  dualism.	  She	  writes	  “The	  thought,	  ‘This	  can’t	  be	  happening	  to	  me,	  I’m	  a	  human	  being.	  I	  am	  more	  than	  just	  food!’	  was	  one	  component	  of	  my	  terminal	  incredulity.	  It	  was	  a	  shocking	  reduction,	  from	  complex	  human	  being	  to	  a	  mere	   piece	   of	   meat”	   (Plumwood,	   1996:	   39).	   It	   is	   here	   that	   we	   encounter	   not	   only	  Plumwood’s	   honesty	   in	   her	   account	   of	   her	   experiences,	   as	   such	   thoughts	   –	   like	   those	  previously	  described	  in	  relation	  to	  her	  sense	  of	  ‘Britishness’	  –	  appear	  to	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  much	  of	  her	  theoretical	  work.	  We	  also	  encounter	  just	  how	  complex	  senses	  of	  place	  are.	  The	   delineation	   between	   emplacement	   and	   displacement	   is	   not	   only	   a	   radical	   over-­‐simplification	  of	  how	  we	  are	  within	  place,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  distortion	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  comings	   and	   goings	   that	   occur	   as	   self	   within	   place.	   As	   Plumwood	   (2008)	   recounts,	  dualisms	   –	   including	   that	   of	   human/nature	   –	   strip	  place	   of	  meaning	   and	   significance;	  they	   remove	   us	   from	   place.	   Yet	   as	   deeply	   embedded	   cultural	   components	   they	   also	  frame	   how	   we	   feel	   at	   home	   within	   place.	   Plumwood,	   as	   culturally	   enmeshed,	   finds	  familiarity	   in	   a	  moment	   of	   deep	   ontological	   crisis	  within	   the	   coloniser/colonised	   and	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human/nature	   dualisms,	   yet	   knows	   only	   too	   well	   what	   potentially	   restrictive	   and	  disenfranchising	  places	  these	  dualisms	  maintain.vi	  CONCLUSION	  Plumwood’s	   sense	   of	   place	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   crocodile	   attack	   is	   a	   sense	   of	   place	   that	  continually	  slips	  between	  and	  through	  many	  of	  Relph’s	  descriptions	  of	   insideness	  and	  outsideness.	  It	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  place	  that	  is	  situationally	  nuanced	  and	  highly	  complex.	  The	  profound	  displacement	  she	  experiences	  is	  tangled	  up	  within	  significant	  and	  meaningful	  experiences	   of	   emplacement	   –	   be	   this	   emplacement	   within	   images	   and	   imaginings,	  knowledge,	   cultural	   imperatives	   and/or	   the	  materiality	  of	  place.	   Following	   the	  attack,	  Plumwood’s	   return	   home	   remains	   entwined	   with	   her	   experiences	   of	   displacement	  associated	  with	  the	  crocodile	  attack,	  not	  in	  opposition	  to	  it.	  For	  Plumwood	  these	  are	  not	  two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  experiences	  and	  neither	  are	  they	  different	  by	  degree.	  Rather	  they	  move	   in	   and	   out	   of	   each	   other,	   and	   through	   and	   beneath	   each	   other.	   As	   such,	   for	  Plumwood	  displacement	   is	  not	  a	  homologous	  singular	  experience,	  but	  one	  which,	   like	  emplacement,	  carries	  within	  it	  a	  flux	  of	  richness	  and	  texture.	  	  To	  be	  emplaced	  is	  not	   just	  about	   feeling	  good.	  To	  be	  emplaced	  is	   to	  experience	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  place	  –	  the	  wonder	  and	  the	  joy,	  and	  the	  hurt	  and	  the	  horror	  –	  and	  to	  dwell,	  as	  Plumwood	  does,	  within	  this	  multiplicity.	  	  Acknowledging	   experiences	   of	   displacement	   as	   radically	   entwined	   within	  experiences	  of	  emplacement	  calls	  for	  a	  restructuring	  and	  a	  rehousing	  of	  how	  and	  what	  these	   experiences	   are	   understood	   to	   be.	   It	   calls	   for	   a	   revisioning	   of	   Relph’s	   (1976)	  notions	  of	  insideness	  and	  outsideness	  to	  include	  a	  complexity	  overlooked	  bytheir	  linear	  representation;	   a	   revisioning	   that	   can	   openly	   accommodate	   the	   multiplicity	   of	  experiencing	   and	   how	   differing	   types	   of	   experience	   entwine,	   interconnect,	   mix	   and	  meld.	   Such	   a	   revisioning	   is	   likely	   to	   include	   the	   incorporation	   and	   prioritisation	   of	  issues	   of	   power	   and	   justice	   within	   emerging	   articulations	   of	   ‘placement’	   as	   it	   is	  powerlessness	   and	   injustice	   that	   render	   experiences	   of	   displacement	   problematic	  rather	  than	  these	  experiences	  in	  and	  of	  themselves.	  Importantly	  such	  a	  revisioning	  must	  include	   issues	  of	  power	  and	   justice	  pertaining	   to	  both	   the	  human	  and	   the	  more-­‐than-­‐human.	  	  Moving	   to	   dismantle	   the	   emplacement/displacement	   dualism	   is,	   in	   effect	   a	  homecoming.	   It	   is	  part	  of	  a	  move	  towards	  reparation	  of	  so	  much	  that	  western	  culture	  has	   backgrounded	   and	   denied,	   and	   it	   is	   part	   of	   a	   move	   towards	   recognising	   of	   the	  multiplicity	  and	  complexity	  of	  place,	  and	  self	  in	  relation	  to	  place.	  Importantly,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  homecoming	   steeped	   in	  nostalgia;	   it	   is	  not	  about	  yearning	   for	  a	  home	   in	  a	  different	  time	  and	  space.	  This	  is	  a	  homecoming	  of	  where	  we	  are	  now	  within	  the	  ups	  and	  downs	  of	  life,	  where	  we	   lose	   footing	  and	  gain	   it	  again	   in	  complex	  and	  nuanced	  ways	  within	   the	  shifting	  terrain	  of	  place.	  In	  this	  we	  are	  always,	  already	  coming	  home:	  I	  danced	  that	  year.	  I	  was	  dancing	  the	  deer-­‐hoof	  music,	  the	  Water	  Shaking.	  I	  saw	  him	  standing	  with	  some	  Blue	  Clay	  people	  and	  Shadow	  and	  Ekwerkwe.	  After	  the	  dance	  I	  went	  over	  there.	  He	  greeted	  me,	  saying,	  ‘That’s	  a	  good	  middle	  name	  that	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came	  to	  you,	  Woman	  Coming	  Home.	  Do	  you	  have	  to	  go	  away	  again	  so	  that	  it	  can	  go	  on	  being	  true?’	  ‘No,’	  I	  said,	  ‘I’m	  learning	  to	  be	  my	  name.’	  (Le	  Guin,	  1986:	  367)	  A	  challenge	   for	  place	  discourse	   is	   to	  recognise	  the	  continuity	  and	  differences	  between	  experiences	   of	   emplacement	   and	   displacement	   –	   to	   give,	   on	   their	   own	   terms,	  experiences	  of	  displacement	  a	  home	  within	  the	  emplacement	  of	  self.	  	  	  ENDNOTES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
iA	  number	  of	  versions	  of	  ‘Being	  Prey’	  have	  been	  published	  including	  Plumwood	  (1996;	  1999).	  	  iiFor	  example,	  the	  hyperseparation	  of	  the	  emplaced	  and	  emplacing	  wild	  from	  the	  displaced	  and	  displacing	  built	  within	  environmental	  ethics	  (Booth,	  2008;	  Light,	  2001).	  	  iiiThis	  example	  from	  Shepard	  (1977)	  is	  cited	  by	  deep	  ecologists	  Bill	  Devall	  and	  George	  Sessions	  (1985)	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  place.	  	  
ivPlumwood	   (1993;	   2002)	   asserts	   that	   deep	   ecology,in	   failing	   to	   adequately	   addresscultural	   dualism,	  remains	  mired	  within	  dualistic	  suppositions.	  Others	  have	  developed	  Plumwood’s	  observations	  regarding	  the	  self/other	  dualism	  perceived	  within	  deep	  ecology	  (see	  Warren,	  1999;	  Diehm,	  2002;	  2003).	  vSee	   also	   Mathews	   Humphery	   (2000),	   Peter	   Van	   Wyck	   (1997)	   and	   Michael	   Zimmerman	   (2000),	   who	  make	  similar	  claims	  with	  regard	  to	  deep	  ecological	  conceptions	  of	  place	  and	  emplacement.	  	  
vi	   Rod	   Giblett	   (2009)	   is	   surprised	   at	   what	   he	   describes	   as	   Plumwood’s	   reproduction	   not	   only	   of	   the	  “patriarchal,	  western	  moralisation	   of	   the	  wet-­‐landscape,	   but	   also	   its	   dualisms,	   spatial	  metaphysics	   and	  poetics	  of	  land	  and	  water,	  good	  and	  bad,	  white	  and	  black,	  heaven	  and	  hell,	  above	  and	  below”	  (2009:	  31).	  In	   this	   he	   fails	   to	   recognise	   that	   Plumwood’s	   account	   of	   her	   crocodile	   attack	   is	   an	   embodied	  phenomenological	   narrative,	   one	   within	   which	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   apply	   theory	   andsimply	   throw	   off	  cultural	   structures	  without	   first	  moving	   to	   carefully	   and	   thoughtfully	   critic	   and	   qualify	   them.	   The	   void	  resulting	  from	  such	  an	  attempt	  will	  only	  be	  filled	  by	  the	  same	  structure	  though	  perhaps	   in	  a	  new	  form,	  and	  we	  would	  be	  left	  floundering	  within	  Plumwood’s	  Desert	  of	  Difference	  (1993).	  Giblett’s	  attempt	  to	  do	  away	  with	   the	   cultural	   baggage	   that	   he	   sees	   as	   entwined	   in	   our	   relationship	  with	   crocodiles	   results	   in	  what	   is	  perhaps	  a	  novel	   though	   largely	  unconvincing	  and	  meaningless	  account	  of	  human	  and	  crocodile	  relations.	   He	   has	   attempted	   to	   throw	   out	   part	   of	   that	   which	   is	   required	   to	   start	   a	   dialogue	   for	   a	   new	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship.	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